Unprovoked military aggression is wrong, crude and uncivilised. It belongs to the past, and those who continue to use violence to pursue their aims will ultimately be buried in that past.
I remain pessimistic that military conflicts can be resolved through words alone. Numerous broken UN resolutions have demonstrated this.
Lasting settlements will only be achieved when aggressive behaviour no longer produces political or economic rewards for those who pursue it.
War must be economically and strategically damaging for the aggressor by increasing the costs and reducing the likelihood of success.
As long as violence delivers benefits at home and influence on the world stage, aggressors will not choose peace simply because others urge them to.
Diplomacy becomes credible only when violence stops looking like the best route to territory, control, prestige, or leverage. Some leaders and their supporters weigh gains against costs in a way they will not change unless they are forced to.
Central to peace is the removal of incentives. If violence continues to appear profitable, then it will be used again and again. This is the hard logic behind deterrence: the aggressor must believe it cannot achieve its goals quickly and that it will face real, serious and sustained economic and military resistance.
It must also face consequences that do not fade after each diplomatic phase. If the aggressor believes it can damage others and then step back without lasting, painful costs, negotiations will not alter its underlying incentives.
Until these conditions hold, threats and attacks will continue, especially in the Middle East, where Israel has yet to learn that violence doesn’t pay.
GCC countries have much to gain by becoming allies and by not allowing third-party actors to create divisions. Oman’s respected role as an honest broker is well known, but mediation alone cannot overcome incentives that keep war rewarding.
If the war economy enriches parts of the elite and self-interested lobbyists and protects the political position of powerful actors, then conflict remains an instrument of governance rather than a temporary aberration.
Some aggressors also have business interests directly tied to war, such as security networks and arms or procurement-related companies.
Where those businesses continue to earn from conflict, they will push for continuation and escalation. Peace, therefore, depends on cutting the financial links between conflict and elite enrichment by enforcing stricter weapons procurement standards, exposing corruption and punishing illegal money transactions that keep violence funded.
Without weakening the structures that sustain war as a business model, talks can be used by the aggressor as tactical pauses to allow it to regroup.
Escalation can be driven by powerful lobbyists that leaders do not fully restrain, and there must be stronger control of security forces by civilians with powers independent of the executive. Clear and enforceable rules on the use of force are necessary, along with genuine accountability.
Leaders who choose war over diplomacy, except in self-defence, should be more easily removed from office. Because aggression can bring quick political returns by rallying supporters, silencing critics and uniting factions around an external enemy, diplomacy must be backed by results and seen as the best route to a strong economy and stable governance.
Improving conditions at home will then become the more rewarding path for those in power. Less powerful states require protection because deterrence fails when aggressors perceive low risk and limited consequences.
Alliances, security guarantees and collective defence arrangements reduce the chance that force will succeed cheaply and quickly.
When aggressors are forced to realise that attacks will trigger organised resistance rather than local collapse, violence becomes less attractive as a strategy.
Peace talks in this region, often with Oman playing the role of intermediary, have sometimes faltered not because of Oman’s lack of trying, but because they lacked trust, verification and enforceable commitments.
Negotiations must be backed by credible economic and military costs for those who renege on agreements. Without realistic enforcement to punish those who act in bad faith, talks may only provide a brief, temporary lull in hostilities.
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