When good scores conceal poor service

Imagine a citizen leaving an office with an unresolved request while a dashboard upstairs logs another completed transaction. The employee has met the target; the institution’s score has improved. The citizen, meanwhile, must return tomorrow.
The scene raises a real question: when does better measurement produce better government?
Oman’s drive to strengthen public-sector performance deserves support. Clear expectations can recognise effort, expose bottlenecks and replace arbitrary judgements with evidence. Evidence from Europe and Asia, however, points to a persistent danger: people can become adept at satisfying an assessment while the service itself barely improves.
England demonstrates both the promise and the risk. Studies comparing hospital waiting times in England and Scotland found that targets in England reduced waits. A later study found no deterioration in the patient outcomes it examined. Well-chosen targets can focus attention and deliver public benefit.
Elsewhere in the English NHS, however, the picture was less reassuring. Bevan and Hood’s 2006 analysis described how pressure to offer GP appointments within two working days led some practices to restrict advance bookings. Patients seeking certainty encountered a barrier created by a measure intended to improve access.
The lesson is to follow the citizen’s entire journey. Faster processing is a hollow achievement if errors, repeat visits or unresolved requests increase. Reported progress should be independently verified.
Portugal brings the question of fairness into sharper focus. Introduced in 2004, its integrated appraisal system links the performance of institutions, managers and employees. The architecture makes sense: individual contribution belongs within organisational performance and leadership responsibility.
Yet a peer-reviewed survey of 2,066 Portuguese civil servants, including managers, found strongly negative perceptions of the system’s objectivity, transparency and fairness. These perceptions do not prove that services deteriorated, but they reveal a serious challenge for a reform that depends on employees accepting its judgements.
Portugal later revised its public-sector appraisal quotas. From 2025, up to 60 per cent of employees assessed could receive one of two higher ratings: up to 30 per cent could be rated “Very Good” (with “Excellent” recognition capped at 10 per cent of those assessed), and a further 30 per cent could be rated “Good”. These ratings count towards pay progression, but do not guarantee promotion. Quotas remained, although the cap on these ratings increased.
South Korea offers an even more striking illustration. A peer-reviewed study described officials in some ministries pooling performance bonuses meant to differentiate between individuals, then redistributing them among colleagues. The incentive remained on paper; its intended effect was neutralised.
Interviewees linked this practice to doubts about appraisal fairness and a desire to preserve cooperation. The study also reported improved perceptions as appraisal arrangements evolved. This evidence concerned particular organisations and periods; it was not a verdict on the entire Korean system. Nevertheless, it shows why employee trust deserves attention during implementation.
Singapore offers a constructive design lesson. Its Public Service Division has described supervisor training, greater ministry autonomy and individual development plans, introduced in 2014 to encourage regular career conversations. These arrangements show how assessment can become an ongoing process of guidance, feedback and development.
What should Oman take from these experiences?
Begin with a few objectives that matter. Meetings held, reports submitted and training attended describe activity. The harder question is what improved as a result. Combine volume with quality, timeliness, accessibility and public benefit.
Make leaders accountable for the conditions that affect performance. Employees cannot fix inadequate systems on their own, acquire authority they do not have or resolve delays caused by another institution. Managers should identify these constraints, act on them and explain what remains unresolved. Otherwise, appraisal merely transfers responsibility downwards.
Protect fairness. Employees need clear standards, consistent application, evidence-based moderation and a credible appeals process. Where rating quotas operate, examine whether they recognise demonstrated achievement or force managers to ration recognition. Staff should know what excellent performance requires and have a realistic opportunity to attain it.
Reward cooperation. The colleague who shares expertise, prevents an error or helps another department may create value without owning the final output. Public goals such as employment, investment and regional development also require institutions to work together. Separate achievements should add up to a public result.
Finally, assess the assessment system. Review service outcomes, staff confidence, reporting burden and unintended behaviour. Low scores should prompt diagnosis and support, with proportionate consequences where warranted. High scores should withstand scrutiny. A system that demands more documentation without delivering better services needs correction.
Oman can make performance management a source of institutional learning and public trust. To do so, leaders must be willing to question comfortable numbers and listen to inconvenient evidence.
Now, let us return to the citizen at the counter: when the unnecessary second visit disappears, the improvement is real.