A residual culture that navigates amid the noise

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Lord Acton’s warning feels increasingly relevant in an age where unpredictability itself has become a political instrument.
What we are witnessing in the US under President Donald Trump is not merely populism or nationalism in their traditional sense. It is a more accentuated form of personalised power: intensely transactional, emotionally disruptive and strategically unpredictable.
Each time observers conclude that the rhetoric cannot become harsher, the pressure cannot become greater, or the behaviour cannot become more erratic, another surprise emerges. Whether through threats against allies, abrupt policy reversals, economic coercion, or pressure campaigns directed externally and internally alike, the governing pattern increasingly appears to be one of perpetual escalation.
The recent remarks threatening Oman over the Strait of Hormuz issue should therefore not be viewed merely as an isolated outburst. They should be understood within this broader pattern: a politics that increasingly uses shock, pressure, uncertainty and public intimidation as negotiating tools.
For smaller states, this creates a dangerous temptation: to react emotionally to emotional politics. That would be a mistake. Oman’s strategic tradition has never been built on noise. It has been built on disciplined calmness.
The first lesson for Oman is therefore epistemic: go placidly amid the noise. In a world flooded with media storms, threats, intelligence leaks, diplomatic signalling and market panic, the first responsibility of a state is not reaction but discernment. What is real policy? What is negotiation theatre? What is temporary pressure? And what merely seeks to provoke reaction?
A state that responds emotionally to every signal eventually loses control over its own strategic judgment.
This is particularly important in moments such as the current one. Oman should neither ignore threatening rhetoric nor amplify it emotionally. Instead, it should convert noise into structure. Publicly, Muscat should remain calm, dignified and legally grounded: affirming sovereignty, commitment to freedom of navigation, regional stability and international law. Privately, however, it should seek precision: is the rhetoric official policy, negotiation pressure, or political theatre intended for domestic audiences?
The distinction matters strategically.
The second lesson comes from both Machiavelli and Sun Tzu: sovereignty is preserved not merely through defiance, but through indispensability. Power respects usefulness more than sentiment.
Oman should therefore continue shaping itself into a state that major powers may pressure rhetorically, but cannot afford to alienate strategically. Geography, maritime access, mediation credibility, logistical connectivity, energy routes, financial stability and diplomatic trust must all operate together as one strategic proposition.
Yet there is another dimension often overlooked in discussions of strategy: residual culture. Nations survive not only through military capability or economic resilience, but through deeply rooted cultural instincts accumulated across generations. Oman’s residual culture has historically favoured restraint over spectacle, mediation over impulsiveness, dignity over theatricality and social cohesion over emotional mobilisation.
This cultural inheritance matters strategically.
Omanis should not join the drums of war, hysteria, or emotional escalation — not out of fear, weakness, or submission, but out of reason and responsibility. A society that loses its internal composure during moments of external pressure becomes easier to manipulate from abroad.
In volatile times, strategic calmness becomes a form of national power.
The objective therefore is simple: to remain sovereign without becoming isolated; to remain principled without becoming ideological; and to remain calm while others become increasingly erratic.
Britain may still offer some value as a stabilising interlocutor with institutional memory, security depth, and a longstanding understanding of Gulf political culture. Yet Oman must recognise that no external actor can substitute for its own strategic resilience.
That resilience ultimately depends on one principle: never allowing another state’s unpredictability to dictate Oman’s behaviour.
The emerging international order may become more volatile, more personalised and less restrained by institutional norms. But smaller states do not survive such eras through outrage. They survive through composure, strategic depth and the ability to remain rational when others are not. That may ultimately become Oman’s greatest strategic advantage.