Beyond the false choice of climate and growth
For too long, climate action has been framed as something added after growth, or as a constraint placed on countries still building roads, industries, housing, schools and jobs
Published: 05:05 PM,May 06,2026 | EDITED : 09:05 PM,May 06,2026
For the third time in 50 years, an energy crisis in the Gulf is being used as evidence for opposite arguments. One side says the war proves we cannot afford the transition. The other side says it proves we cannot afford anything else. I spent this week in Milan watching a generation of young diplomats decide which side was correct, in real time.
Somewhere between the forum halls, a cappuccino, and preparing for my flight back to Muscat, I read the latest news from IRENA. Round the clock renewables, meaning solar and wind paired with battery storage, are increasingly able to compete with new coal and gas in many regions. The finding felt less like a surprise than a confirmation of what markets, tenders, and power systems have been signalling for some time. The old debate asked whether renewables could be reliable. The new debate is whether institutions can redesign themselves around the fact that, increasingly, they can.
The mistake is that we keep speaking about the energy transition as one story moving at one speed, when it is two structural shifts happening at once. One has already crossed into delivery, with cheaper renewable power, storage, electrification, and changing industrial economics. The other remains harder, especially for the parts of industry, transport, and storage that still need policy, finance, demand, infrastructure, and patience.
The sharper question is what this means for the Global South. For too long, climate action has been framed as something added after growth, or as a constraint placed on countries still building roads, industries, housing, schools and jobs. In many places, this framing is collapsing. Projects are now being funded for cheaper power, increasing competitiveness and growth, climate resilience, energy security, and employment at once.
Take the example of Morocco where solar is the cheapest way to generate power and support industrial growth where this is now the development pathway. Oman is signing some of the world’s lowest solar tariffs while building the wider conditions for renewable energy and future industries. The same pattern is visible in Vietnam, Brazil, India, and parts of Africa, where the transition is gaining traction because it can deliver growth, jobs, investment, and resilience together. The old question asked whether development should come before climate. The evidence is increasingly showing that the strongest development pathways are already climate pathways.
This is where nexus thinking becomes essential. In the water, energy, and food conversation, the logic is already clear. Energy cannot be planned without water. Water cannot be moved without energy. Food cannot be grown without both. A decision that strengthens one system while weakening the others simply prepares the next crisis in advance.
The same discipline now needs to shape how we speak about climate, development, and security, especially when we discuss a just energy transition. A transition can lower emissions and still fail people if it does not protect jobs, water, food systems, affordability and stability. Every project, funding mechanism, strategy, and partnership should be tested against all three from the start. Does it reduce climate risk? Does it protect development gains? Does it lower exposure to fragility or conflict?
This is the work institutions globally have been too slow to do. They have built climate, development, and security as separate files, while the energy transition is proving that the future will be shaped by their convergence. Until institutions are designed to see the integration from the start, we will keep responding to the same crisis three times, late, in three different rooms.