The US-India relationship is changing again

India’s relationship with the United States has long been a careful balancing act between shared democratic values and sometimes diverging national interests. But recent diplomatic tremors have unsettled India, prompting it to question whether the partnership has reached a turning point.
In what Indian officials view as an unsettling display of geopolitical grandstanding, US President Donald Trump has taken credit for halting recent hostilities between India and Pakistan by threatening to disrupt trade ties. India has bristled at Trump’s claims, not only because it is fiercely protective of its sovereignty, but also because they lack merit. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar have noted, Trump did not even call them during the conflict. Bilateral trade was not mentioned by any US official while the fighting was under way.
Trump may well have pressed Pakistan to end the violence, but India did not need persuading. As a status-quo power focused on its own economic development, the last thing India wanted was a protracted conflict. So, after terrorists slaughtered Indian civilians in Pahalgam in April, India devised a sharp, swift and measured response. It was always clear that “Operation Sindoor” — which featured strikes on nine known terrorist basecamps and other facilities in Pakistani territory — was retribution against the terrorists who had targeted Indian tourists, not the opening salvo in a war against Pakistan.
When Pakistan retaliated with indiscriminate attacks, India initiated another decisive but carefully calibrated strike — this time, on 11 air bases. It was this manoeuver — possibly coupled with US pressure on Pakistan’s government — that prompted Pakistan to seek a cessation of hostilities. Trump hardly deserves credit for this outcome and yet, true to form, he has sought to claim it. But Indian officials have unequivocally rejected Trump’s narrative. India is proud of its independence and it will not tolerate the implication that it succumbed to Trumpian threats or blandishments.
This is not Trump’s only action that is giving India pause. In June, he hosted Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir. Pakistan’s civilian leadership was not at the table.
Trump’s unpredictability vis-à-vis China is similarly troubling. Whereas he took a reliably hardline approach to the country during his first presidency, Trump 2.0 blows hot and cold. One minute, he is imposing extreme tariffs against China; the next, he is seeking to negotiate a trade truce and saying that he might visit Beijing at Chinese President Xi Jinping’s invitation.
Where India fits into these calculations — if it factors into them at all — is a mystery. During Trump’s first term — as well as during Joe Biden’s presidency — the US regarded India as a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific. While India upheld its foreign-policy doctrine of strategic autonomy and avoided committing to any confrontation with China, it welcomed US engagement in the region and supported the revitalisation of the Quad, which includes Australia, Japan and the US, in 2017. After all, India has its own quarrels with China.
Meanwhile, China’s influence across South Asia is growing, extending from Bhutan and Nepal to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Indian officials and businesses see China as a threat. But it is difficult to know where the US stands, especially after Trump opted not to rebuke China publicly for offering intelligence assistance to Pakistan. When it comes to trade, moreover, Trump has often been tougher on partners than adversaries. On July 30, Trump announced a 25 per cent tariff on Indian goods, effective August 1, together with an unspecified “penalty” — probably an additional 10 per cent — for India’s ongoing purchases of energy and military equipment from Russia. If trade can be weaponised, defence ties could be, too.
Trump’s capriciousness has heightened India’s strategic anxieties. The US has proved to be an unreliable partner before. For example, during the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, the US denied India access to vital GPS data, leading the country to develop its own. Now, Indian decision-makers are split: Should India decouple from China, trusting the US to have its back, or pragmatically engage with it, for fear that the US will do the same? This raises an even more fundamental question: What is the value of a partnership that is subject to the whims of an outsize ego?
India will not panic, but it might pivot. Given its lack of treaty obligations, it has greater leeway to act independently than formal US allies like Japan or South Korea. It might use this manoeuvering room to adjust its foreign-policy orientation. Jaishankar’s July visit to Beijing pointed to a desire to broaden channels of communication with China. While India is not downgrading its ties with the US, it is emphasising self-reliance. This may lead to a more transactional bilateral relationship, shaped less by ideals than interests.
@Project Syndicate, 2025