Remembering a dawn that changed fate of Zanzibar (Part 3_)
Published: 03:01 PM,Jan 29,2023 | EDITED : 07:01 PM,Jan 29,2023
Al Kharusi blames the Commissioner of Police, Jack Sullivan, among many other reasons, for the fall of independent Zanzibar. He explained this by saying: two days before the Invasion, the recently appointed Commissioner, ordered both Al Kharusi, in his capacity as the second man in the police force, to head to Urowa, 24 miles from Zanzibar on the east coast, and Mohammed Salim Al Sketi, the third man in the police force, to go to Makunduchi, 41 miles South West from the City of Zanzibar.
Their mission, as he told them, was to gauge the pulse of the man in the street in these two areas which were known to be strongholds of the opposition party. As their respective missions coincided with the weekend before the beginning of Ramadhan, the two officers took their families with them for some quality time together.
In Urowa on Sunday 12th of January 1964, just after Al Kharusi had performed the Fajer prayer, he was surprised to see the Sheha (chieftain) of Urowa knocking on his door to tell him that riots had broken out in the City of Zanzibar and the situation had become extremely volatile and untenable. Without further ado, Al Kharusi left the area, along with his family, heading to Zanzibar to deal with the situation. When he got as far as Mwera, some 6 miles from the city centre, he decided to stop in at the Police Station to check on the security situation in the town as he had just heard on the radio the news of the government's overthrow, and the calling to the government to surrender, and to HM. the Sultan to hang himself.
His nephew Lieutenant Mohammed Ali Kharusi was the station officer and was on duty along with 12 policemen all armed with rifles. Sulaiman Al Kharusi telephoned Commissioner of Police Sullivan who was barricaded in Malindi Police Station. He asked him about the security situation there and Sullivan told him that the City of Zanzibar had fallen under the control of the rebels who were shooting indiscriminately at anyone in their way. Sullivan advised Kharusi to seek a hideout and to keep a low profile for his own safety. Kharusi decided not to give up. He at once sent his family to an Omani family that he knew in Urowa, very close to the police station, and gave his wife a (.22 m) pistol to defend themselves in case the house was raided or broken into. However, she did not have to use it. Kharusi went back to the police station, took command of the station from his nephew, the young Kharusi, and reordered the deployment of the available workforce in view of his vast experience in police operations. Indeed, being well equipped, he and his men were able to repel the attacks by the rebels, who were armed only with sharp weapons such as spears and machetes.
The Commissioner of Police's treason is evident in his response to Kharusi's requests. Kharusi had phoned Sullivan to inform him that he had the situation under control at Mwera Police Station, and asked him to provide a means of transport in order that he and his men could go to support and assist Malindi Police Station which was still showing resistance against the rebels. The Commissioner of Police gave him the same answer as before - that there was no way they could reach the town as all roads were closed. Kharusi then asked Sullivan to send a boat to the Sultan's Rest House in Kibweni, to take them to the city. But again the Commissioner said that it was not possible as the boats were engaged in other security tasks, the nature of which he did not reveal. Kharusi maintains he later learned that the few available Police boats were being kept on standby just in case there would be a need to evacuate European families to the British ships. Clearly he had put the interest of his compatriots before the interest of the state in repelling this aggression.
Sullivan's treason did not end at deliberately keeping away from Zanzibar the two highest ranking officers in the Police Force; his meanness went further by playing down the Prime Minister's directives. On Friday evening, 11th January 1964, the Prime Minister had conclusive information to the effect that the ASP was plotting to stage a string of riots. He summoned Commissioner of Police, relayed this information to him and ordered him to take the appropriate security measures and precautions to maintain law and order. The Commissioner reassured the Prime Minister by saying: 'the situation will be under control.' However, instead of distributing adequate quantities of weapons and ammunition to the police personnel, he thought it was enough to simply declare a third class alert, i.e. a type of alert that is normally issued for an important football match.
To be continued, ...
Translated by Dr Ali bin Rashid Al Abri
Their mission, as he told them, was to gauge the pulse of the man in the street in these two areas which were known to be strongholds of the opposition party. As their respective missions coincided with the weekend before the beginning of Ramadhan, the two officers took their families with them for some quality time together.
In Urowa on Sunday 12th of January 1964, just after Al Kharusi had performed the Fajer prayer, he was surprised to see the Sheha (chieftain) of Urowa knocking on his door to tell him that riots had broken out in the City of Zanzibar and the situation had become extremely volatile and untenable. Without further ado, Al Kharusi left the area, along with his family, heading to Zanzibar to deal with the situation. When he got as far as Mwera, some 6 miles from the city centre, he decided to stop in at the Police Station to check on the security situation in the town as he had just heard on the radio the news of the government's overthrow, and the calling to the government to surrender, and to HM. the Sultan to hang himself.
His nephew Lieutenant Mohammed Ali Kharusi was the station officer and was on duty along with 12 policemen all armed with rifles. Sulaiman Al Kharusi telephoned Commissioner of Police Sullivan who was barricaded in Malindi Police Station. He asked him about the security situation there and Sullivan told him that the City of Zanzibar had fallen under the control of the rebels who were shooting indiscriminately at anyone in their way. Sullivan advised Kharusi to seek a hideout and to keep a low profile for his own safety. Kharusi decided not to give up. He at once sent his family to an Omani family that he knew in Urowa, very close to the police station, and gave his wife a (.22 m) pistol to defend themselves in case the house was raided or broken into. However, she did not have to use it. Kharusi went back to the police station, took command of the station from his nephew, the young Kharusi, and reordered the deployment of the available workforce in view of his vast experience in police operations. Indeed, being well equipped, he and his men were able to repel the attacks by the rebels, who were armed only with sharp weapons such as spears and machetes.
The Commissioner of Police's treason is evident in his response to Kharusi's requests. Kharusi had phoned Sullivan to inform him that he had the situation under control at Mwera Police Station, and asked him to provide a means of transport in order that he and his men could go to support and assist Malindi Police Station which was still showing resistance against the rebels. The Commissioner of Police gave him the same answer as before - that there was no way they could reach the town as all roads were closed. Kharusi then asked Sullivan to send a boat to the Sultan's Rest House in Kibweni, to take them to the city. But again the Commissioner said that it was not possible as the boats were engaged in other security tasks, the nature of which he did not reveal. Kharusi maintains he later learned that the few available Police boats were being kept on standby just in case there would be a need to evacuate European families to the British ships. Clearly he had put the interest of his compatriots before the interest of the state in repelling this aggression.
Sullivan's treason did not end at deliberately keeping away from Zanzibar the two highest ranking officers in the Police Force; his meanness went further by playing down the Prime Minister's directives. On Friday evening, 11th January 1964, the Prime Minister had conclusive information to the effect that the ASP was plotting to stage a string of riots. He summoned Commissioner of Police, relayed this information to him and ordered him to take the appropriate security measures and precautions to maintain law and order. The Commissioner reassured the Prime Minister by saying: 'the situation will be under control.' However, instead of distributing adequate quantities of weapons and ammunition to the police personnel, he thought it was enough to simply declare a third class alert, i.e. a type of alert that is normally issued for an important football match.
To be continued, ...
Translated by Dr Ali bin Rashid Al Abri